Abstract: Transitioning towards organic consumption and production has been widely promoted as a more sustainable alternative for urban and rural food systems. Our paper shows how a focus on legitimacy can shed light on current barriers to deeper institutionalisation of the organic labelling scheme in China. Based upon documentary analysis, personal observations and over 70 qualitative interviews we identify consequential concerns amongst China's small scale farmers, limited support by the Chinese central government, and procedural problems as the main barriers. We discuss strategies to overcome these barriers, for example tighter certification procedures or more participatory arrangements. Our work contributes to the legitimacy, product labelling and food safety literatures as well as bourgeoning discussions on how to facilitate more sustainable consumption and production in China .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 1 Institutionalising the organic labelling scheme in China: a legitimacy perspective
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Introduction
Transitioning towards more sustainable agricultural production and consumption in China is increasingly viewed as a crucial piece in the global sustainability puzzle. An alignment with organic labelling standards, in other words, a shift toward organic consumption and production is a widely promoted path to achieve these goals (Vittersø and Tangeland 2015; Reisch et al. 2013; Thøgersen et al. this volume; Yi et al. 2001; Qiao et al. this volume) . The stated aim of the International Federation for Organic Agricultural Movement (IFOAM) and the Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FIBL) is for organic consumption and production to become the mainstream approach to sustainability worldwide (Willer and Lernoud 2015) . Some argue (Klintman and Bostroem 2012) that organic trends are already far from being insignificant with obvious potential for overall food transitions. Revenues from sales of organic produce have 2 increased almost five fold since 1999 with more and more land certified to organic standards in almost all regions of the world (Willer and Lernoud 2015) .
China, home to the world s largest food and beverage retail market (Garnett and Wilkes 2014) , has been no exception to this trend. A total organic acreage of 3.529 million hectares (1.287million hectares certified to Chinese organic standards, 0.807million hectares to foreign organic standards; 1.435 million hectares to wild collection) produced in 2013 a total of 10.808 million tons of organic cereals (588,000 hectares), soybeans and other oilseeds (235,000 hectares), fruits and nuts (221,000 hectares), green fodder (129,000 hectares), tea (53,000 hectares), vegetables (51,000 hectares), and other plants (22.000 hectares) (Meng et al. 2015) , making it the fastest growing sector of Chinese agriculture (Ken Research 2013) and China the fourth largest producer of organic food (Willer and Lernoud 2015) .
Early on, the main aim of aligning Chinese agricultural production with international organic labelling standards was to supply Western markets (International Trade Centre (ITC) 2011; Ken Research 2013; Yin et al. 2010 ). Recent years have seen an increased focus on a rapidly rising Chinese consumer society with organic food officials introducing a national Chinese organic labelling scheme 1 to develop retail sales among China's growing urban middle class" (Thiers 2002: 368) . The strategy has been partly successful: the domestic market for products certified and labelled through the Chinese organic labelling scheme has grown significantly since the mid-2000s, particularly in first tier cities (ITC 2011; Xie et al. 2011;  International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 2005; Yin et al. 2010; Meng et al. 2015) .
China is now the third largest organic market in the world in terms of sales (Willer and Lernoud 2015) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 3 Yet despite its strong growth, the organic sector in China is still in its early infancy (Thøgersen and Zhou 2012: 316) contributing less than 1% of China's agricultural production (Meng et al. 2015) and only 0.29-0.44% of total food consumption (Qiao 2014) . By shedding light on current barriers to deeper institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme, this paper aims to improve our understanding of how China could contribute more to a global transition towards sustainable consumption and production.
To study these barriers, we focus on the notion of legitimacy as many authors consider legitimacy to be of key importance for organisations (e.g. Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 2008; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) , governance schemes (e.g. Biermann et al. 2010; Borras & Conzelmann 2007; Knorringa et al. 2011) and sustainability related product labelling schemes (e.g. Cashore 2002; Black 2008; Dendler 2013) . So far, research on the Chinese organic labelling scheme has mainly focused on consumer knowledge, understanding and/or willingness to pay as well as barriers at the primary production level. Studies of how the construction of legitimacy may facilitate or hinder alignment with its standards are missing. By addressing this gap, our work contributes not only to bourgeoning discussions on how to facilitate more sustainable consumption and production in China but also the wider product labelling, food safety and legitimacy literatures.
In the following we expand on how previous authors have positioned legitimacy as a crucial variable for the success of social entities. We will then apply these concepts to the Chinese organic labelling scheme showing how legitimacy has been constructed around four main principles: procedures, consequences, disposition and regulation. Our analysis is based on a triangulated approach including documentary review, personal observations and interviews with over 70 stakeholders. We explain our method in section three. We illustrate the usefulness of the concepts by discussing how the construction of legitimacy has shaped alignment with the Chinese organic labelling scheme across different actor groups. We then discuss strategies to facilitate a deeper institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme. The last section 4 concludes with reflections on our main findings, their implications for the legitimacy literature and further research.
Literature Review
There is a large interdisciplinary literature on the critical role of legitimacy for the development and success of social entities. Within political sciences, many relate legitimacy to notions of power and authority, framing it as the linchpin that lends justification to the use of power through formal or informal social consent (Beetham 1991) . Within organisational studies, legitimacy is seen to determine the support of an organisation across its internal participants and external constituents (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 2008; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) . Legitimacy is also included in many models of institutional change and institutionalisation processes (DiMaggio 1988; Hargrave and van de Ven 2006; Greenwood et al. 2002) . Dendler (2013) emphasizes its importance for the institutionalisation of social entities that aim to provide a new social order Weber , with product labelling schemes being a prominent example of such entities in current societies. This resonates with many other authors who have stressed the importance of legitimacy for product labelling schemes (Cashore 2002; Black 2008 ) such as the Forest Stewardship Council (Cashore et al. 2006; Waddel and Khagram 2007) , the Marine Stewardship Council (Gulbrandsen 2010; Bostroem 2006) , the European Union ecolabel (Jordan 2006) , energy efficiency (Wiel and McMahon 2005) and organic labels (Hatanaka 2014 ).
Definitions of legitimacy vary across these literatures. Following a new institutional approach, we define legitimacy as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity [in this case the product labelling scheme] are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman 1995: 574) . These perceptions are assumed to be based on individual judgements Tost ;
Bitektine and Haack 2015) along self-interest (i.e pragmatic ), normative (i.e. moral ) and taken for granted (i.e. cognitive ) dimensions (Suchman 1995) . We assume they result in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   5 behavioural consequences, manifest in non-discursive form, such as engagement in exchange relations or imposition of sanctions or in discursive form as expressions of judgements to other actors through social networks, the media, or other channels (Bitektine 2011; Bitektine and Haack 2015) . As such, we hold that legitimacy plays a crucial role in deepening the institutionalisation of product labelling schemes and furthering alignment across systems of consumption and production (Dendler 2013 (Suchman 1995) and/or a new order they aim to institutionalise (Dendler 2013 ) through different legitimation strategies.
So far, our picture has been a rather dynamic one painting legitimacy as a social construction between various actors in the field. However, previous studies in the Western context also found stability. Dendler (2013 Dendler ( , 2014 , for example, identified a clustering of legitimacy constructions around several key principles Leca and Naccache ), including: 6  Consequences: association with positive or negative consequences in relation to individual self-interests or greater societal welfare (Suchman 1995) ;
 Procedures: belief in the validity of the procedures followed (Suchman 1995) , often related to norms of inclusiveness and deliberation;
 Disposition: belief in the (charismatic) exemplariness of an organisation that is perceived to have "our best interests at heart" (Suchman 1995: 578) and/or holds (traditional) public confidence (Suchman 1995; Weber 1922 ) (the former is often associated with NGOs, the latter can be attributed, for example, to governmental organisations).
 Regulation: usually evolving from conformity with laws (Tost 2011; Weber 1922; Barker 1990 ).
With these theoretical arguments in mind, the aim of our research was to investigate the social construction of legitimacy and its impact on institutionalisation in the context of the Chinese organic labelling scheme. To that end we identified legitimation strategies of the organic labelling organisation(s) and generalized legitimacy perceptions and their behavioural consequences in the field. The latter we inferred from judgments aggregated and communicated by macrolevel judgment validation institutions (Bitektine and Haack 2015) and from observable behaviour and discourse of other actors, especially key legitimacy actors (Dendler 2013 ). We used a combination of research methods to meet this aim, which are described in section 3.
Empirics
Firstly, our study drew upon a review of academic and other relevant documents, such as policy reports and plans, administrative documents and organisational reports. All were identified through keyword searches of academic and non-academic databases as well as a review of relevant websites on the Chinese organic labelling scheme. Based upon our review of the legitimacy literature we developed a coding tree consisting of three main branches: Expo) and by following a snow balling approach we arranged further interviews. Ultimately our study involved interviews with actors from across the Chinese food consumption and production system, including those from primary production, processing, trading, retailing (organic and mainstream) as well as non-governmental, governmental, labelling and certification organisations. Interviews were conducted in both English and Mandarin, the latter with the assistance of a translator. Interview recordings and notes were analysed within the software Nvivo drawing upon and further adjusting the coding tree developed during the first phase of the study.
In the next section we discuss the main organisational bodies involved in organic legitimation strategies at different levels, more precisely in standard setting, certification and communication. In section 5 we present our findings about how legitimacy has been constructed by these labelling organisations, and how it has been perceived and constructed further by other actors in the field. In section 6 we consider how these legitimacy constructions have affected the Chinese organic labelling scheme and discuss strategies to facilitate deeper institutionalisation. with added emphasis on contamination by pollutants and prohibited materials and quality management systems (Marchesini 2009; ITC 2011; Sheng et al. 2009; Xiao and Xiaorong 2003) .
The Chinese organic labelling scheme
Since 1994, the Organic Food Development Centre (OFDC) in Nanjing, which is part of the Ministry for Environment, has been the leading official organisation in charge of inspection, certification and management of organic production in China. Their remit extends to management and supervision of the official organic product logo (Sanders 2006a; Yi et al. 2001 Biao and Xiaorong 2003) . According to documents (OFDC-MEP n.d.) and interviews, the OFDC has engaged in planning and research on policies, standard production and technology, as well as publicity, technical support, training and quality control of organic farming. The OFDC are also actively involved in the drafting, revision and evaluation of the organic standards (OFDC- international certification companies including a certification body within OFDC. As with all certification schemes in China, OFDC needs to be approved by the Certification and Accreditation In summary, one can identify OFDC, OFRC and CNCA as the main organisational bodies involved in legitimation strategies at different levels of the consumption and production system.
Certification organisations are also very active in wider legitimacy construction. This includes the building of links between companies; trainings; information services and involvement in the development of organic product standards and policies (see e.g. China Organic Food Certification Centre (COFCC) n.d.). We will now outline how legitimacy has been constructed between these organisations and other actors in the food consumption and production system.
Constructing legitimacy in the context of the Chinese organic labelling scheme
We systematically analysed the secondary and primary data according to the theories described above, using legitimacy principles, namely consequences, procedures, disposition and regulation, as the main structure. Where appropriate we further unpacked legitimacy construction across actor groups.
Consequential legitimacy
The organic labelling scheme has been promoted as providing multiple positive societal 
[…] the organic industry is kind of twisted:
organic is actually about harmony between people and nature and not about food safety.
(Interview 24, translated). The following sub-sections will discuss in more detail how different consequential self-interests shaped judgements across actors groups, including primary producers (farmers), manufacturers, retailers and consumers. (Oelofse et al. 2010 (Oelofse et al. , 2011 IFAD 2005; Zhang et al. 2015) as positive consequences of an alignment of primary production with organic standards. These benefits include creating recognition with and meeting demands of consumers, higher market prices, differentiation from competitors and better market access through improved positioning with retailers and manufacturers. However, not all interviewees recognised these benefits with several commenting on insufficient demand and limited opportunities for price premiums. In addition, farmers spoke of long conversion periods during which they were likely to see yield decreases (see also Xiao and Xiaorong 2003; Zhang et al. 2015; Sanders 2006b Whilst IFAD (2005) advocates a stronger consequential orientation towards wider benefits, such as drought resistance and erosion reduction, improved local nutrition security or protection of biodiversity and clean water sources, we found that such benefits were mentioned less frequently as consequential motivations (Oelofse et al. 2010; Cadilhon 2009; Yin et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2013) . Instead, pragmatic support mechanisms, in particular from local government organisations, appear to be more effective. These include technical and financial (e.g. lower tax 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   12 rates, direct payments, investment and loan privileges, subsidized rental rates and land donations, subsidized bio-pesticides, seeds or organic fertilizers and initial financing for 
Manufacturers and retailers
During interviews, primary producers often mentioned demand from manufacturers and/or retailers as incentives for the support of the organic scheme. Manufacturers pointed to consumer demand and brand image as potential consequential benefits but mainly talked about the associated costs for human resources, certification, materials and processing technology. As organic certification usually needs to be obtained for every ingredient, negative consequences can emerge from having to manage, control and certify often highly fragmented supply chains. have created interest from retailers in providing traceable products (see also Scott and Suarez 2012) . For example, Greenpeace exposed major supermarket chains selling products with illegal pesticides and made the connection with negative impacts on human health (Greenpeace 2006a (Greenpeace , 2006b ). Over the next few years Greenpeace continued to put pressure on retailers to ensure their supply chains were transparent and to minimise pesticide residues (Greenpeace 2011a (Greenpeace , 2011b (Greenpeace , 2012 . While NGOs generally play a comparatively small role in the Chinese organic labelling scheme (see further discussion in section 5.2.3), such activities have captured much attention, especially within Chinese social media. As such, it resonates strongly with NGO driven individualised collective action (Clarke et al. 2007 ) and naming and shaming (Steering   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 
Consumers
Both documents (Yin et al. 2010; Lin, et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2013; Cadilhon 2009; Wang 2014a; Xi 2010; Xie et al. 2015; Yip and Janssen 2015; Siriex et al. 2011 ) and interviews frequently blame high prices for negatively affecting consequential perceptions on the consumer side. Higher production costs, as well as premiums added along the supply chain, means the price of most organic products is at least two to five times higher than that of conventional products (Meng et al. 2015; Thogersen et al. 2015a (Liu et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2011; Whitehead 2015; Xu et al. 2012; Yin et al. 2010; Yang 2011; ITC 2011; Klein 2011) . The purchase of organic certified products has been communicated as directly addressing such concerns by providing a healthier and safe alternative that is more fresh OFRCC, for example, promotes the "virtues of organic food: healthy, security and tasty" (Xi 2010 ). Another interviewee from a certification company described how they organize events for new born babies, young children and the elderly in health centres and hospitals during which nutritionists emphasize the health benefits associated with the consumption of organic certified products (Interview 8). Our own observations supported such descriptions. Resonating with Klein (2011) we found connections to traditional food therapies that draw upon a close 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 14 relationship between human health, nature and rural livelihoods. Recent restructuring strategies target this issue more explicitly by shifting the organic standard from non-use of prohibited materials to one of non-contamination and residue free production assurance (Lernoud et al. 2013) . We discuss these and other procedural changes in the next section.
Procedural legitimacy
Many interviewees referred to the organic scheme as helping to create recognition (e.g. interview 53) and trust (e.g. interview 26). However, both the previous literature (Ken Research 2013; Liu et al. 2013; Scott et al. 2014; Taylor 2008; Veeck et al. 2010; Xie et al. 2015; Chen and Lobo 2012) CNCA officials have publicly acknowledged exaggeration and false promotion, nonstandardised use of the label and insufficient control of the circulation of the label. In response, CNCA engaged in multiple procedural repair strategies. Interviewees reported how immediately following the national TV coverage, CNCA asked all certification organisations to recheck their documentation, resulting in the withdrawal of many certificates. Shortly after, the National Standards for Organic Products were revised, according to Scott et al. (2014: 161) to better protect against fraud . Major changes included not only zero-tolerance for residues but also the introduction of authentication codes for each product to enable consumers to trace their origin (the barcode scheme); prohibition of parallel planting in one-year crops; certified inspection of each crop variety; and inspection of all farms in cooperative groups (Hallmann and Xu 2012) .
16
CNCA announced that they would also increase the control over certification organisations; increase risk management; and strengthen risk assessment of employees through the certification companies. Associated with these changes, a number of interviewees commented on stricter standards, increased monitoring and better traceability; how it was easy to bribe certifiers in the past but not anymore.
[…] They come and test every piece of land (interview 41).
But despite procedural progress, both interviews and documents suggest that procedural problems are not fully solved. During the 2014 Shanghai Biofach Fair, the director of CNCA reported ad hoc checks were still finding around 15% of products using the term organic even though they are incorrectly or not at all certified, around 2% exceeding pesticide levels and 3% not being fully in line with other organic regulation (Wang 2014a).
Dispositional and regulatory legitimacy
Our research found some NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, and other civil societal Instead, the role of the state occupies the foreground. Next to the pragmatic support described above, interviewees described how governmental involvement in the organic labelling organisation contributes to the creation of trust: without government nothing can happen (interview 10), government has to stand behind interview as it is important interview and most powerful interview . Such statements resonate with consumer surveys in the food context (Ortega et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2013 ) and other academic studies on China (e.g. Wang   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 18 enforced with respect to the Chinese language, law enforcement has recently started to extend its scope to the use of the term in other languages (Hallmann and Xu 2012) .
Discussion
In the following we discuss how legitimacy constructions outlined in the previous sections have affected support for the Chinese organic labelling scheme within the current production and consumption system. We then reflect on strategies organic labelling organisations may apply to achieve more positive judgements and facilitate deeper institutionalisation.
Primary producers
As a result of the rural reforms of the early 1980s (Sanders 2006; Selden 2010; Zhang et al. 2013) , farming in China is conducted by millions of small farmers with an average farm size of 0.6 hectares often living on an income of less than $2 per day (Carter et al. 2002; Garnett and Wilkes 2014) . While some argue that farmers poverty has been one of the primary factors in predisposing them to take the risks involved in converting to organic methods Sanders a:
127), our research finds significant consequential barriers. These relate partly to capacity problems in terms of finance, quality control, harvesting or post-harvest techniques. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 19 Bostroem, 2012) and with many other sustainability labelling schemes (Matus Forthcoming; Dendler 2013; Steering Committee 2012) . However, the very high number of small scale farms in China makes this a more acute challenge.
Governmental actors
IFAD ( However, it is interesting to note the limited extent to which government has exercised these types of power. While developing organic agricultural products has appeared repeatedly in China s central policy documents (Liu et al. 2013) , been promoted by some of its senior party leaders (Sanders 2006a ) and incorporated into local government promotion schemes to facilitate green development and eco-civilization Meng et al. 2015; Wang 2014a; Qiao 2010; Xi 2010) , our research suggests more scope for governmental influence. Many interviews, documents (e.g. IFAD 2005) and academic studies (e.g. Zhang et al. 2013) argue that central government support has been comparatively low, lacking substantial funding" Qiao and falling behind the support of other product labelling schemes such as the Green Food Label 2 .
2 Next to the organic labelling scheme, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture hosts a so called Hazard Free and a Green Food labelling schemes. While the emphasis of Hazard Free food is on the residue content, Green Food is based on concepts of environmental protection and sustainable development. Unlike the organic scheme both allow for 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 20 Indeed, the vast majority of resources still promote conventional agriculture (IFAD 2005) . Some observers point to competing ministerial priorities (Taylor 2008) , especially in regard to food security. Given lower productivity rates and greater demands by organic agricultural practices on highly scarce land resources, it is widely considered that organic production cannot provide for China s growing population (Xie 2008; Chen & Wan, 2005 ; Xiao this issue; Scott et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2013) . As one interviewee from a governmental organisation involved in the organic labelling scheme points out: China is a very big country with a big population so the highest priority is to produce enough food for the population, and then it is [about] producing safe food and then it is [about] the environment. That is why the aims for organic are limited (interview 7).
Manufacturers and retailers
In light of limited governmental support, market actors seem to have become more relevant for the institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme. In the Western context, major retailers and branded manufacturers have exercised significant influence on the institutionalisation of organic and other sustainability related product labelling schemes (Dendler 2013; Steering Committee 2012; Bostroem and Klintmann 2008; Gulbrandsen 2006; Klintman and Bostroem 2012) . Several interviewees saw large agricultural companies also as major drivers of the Chinese organic scheme. Generally however, organic food processing is presently in a nascent stage with retailers complaining about insufficient availability of organic (processed) products and the majority of organic farm products being sold as raw products (IFAD 2005; Ken Research 2013; Meng, Fangqiao et al. 2015) . Our research suggests the main barriers for wider manufacturing support are: restricted scope of organic standards (i.e. criteria only covering some processing); difficulties in certifying multi staged, often highly fragmented Chinese food supply chains; procedural contestations and limited relational push .
controlled and limited use of synthesized fertilizer, pesticide, growth regulators, feed additives and gene technology (Liu et al. . They are hence sometimes considered as half-way house between conventional and organic food (Paull 2008) .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 21 Similar barriers hinder retailers. While some documents suggest that conventional supermarkets have become the main channel for selling organic produce (ITC 2011; Xie et al. 2011; Taylor 2008; Meng et al. 2015; Yip and Janssen 2015; Siriex et al. 2011 ), we found negative perceptions and very reserved support for (and further relational influence on) the organic labelling scheme among mainstream retailers.
Consumers
The limited relational push from manufacturer and retailer side can partly be explained with dominant perceptions of consumer demand. While consumer studies identify some demand and willingness to pay for organic certified products amongst Chinese consumers (ITC 2011; Liu et al. 2013; Xie et al. 2011; Yin et al. 2010; Zhang et al. this volume; Yip and Janssen 2015) , this demand is generally considered to be limited to high income consumers in major cities (Lin et al. 2010; Thøgersen and Zhou 2012; Yin et al. 2010; Xie at al. 2015; Thøgersen et al. 2015a; Siriex et al. 2011) . Multiple sources of interview, academic and documentary evidence report collective consumer knowledge and awareness of the organic label to be low, with considerable confusion between different schemes (Yin et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2013; Xi 2010; Zhang et al., this volume; Xie et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2014; Chen and Lobo 2012; Yi et al. 2001) . With current media reporting on the organic scheme focusing mainly on procedural inconsistencies, we find rising mistrust among Chinese consumers and businesses alike. Linked to these procedural doubts, public criticism raises questions about the consequential benefits associated with the purchase of domestic organic certified products and facilitates a shift towards imported rather than Chinese organic certified food (Xie et al. 2011; Walley et al. 2014; ITC 2011; Yip and Janssen 2015; Wu et al. 2014 ).
Potential strategies to facilitate deeper institutionalisation
In the light of such developments, improving perceptions of procedural legitimacy has become one of the main challenges for the deeper institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme. This resonates with global organic trends, where there are increasing problems with fraud (Gould 2015) , and wider discussions about inconsistencies in standard Bottom-up initiatives are an alternative way forward that does not rely on certification.
Although there is no formal support in the Chinese organic regulations for Participatory Guarantee Schemes and participants are not allowed to use the term organic (Wai 2015) , our research found evidence of many primary producers engaging directly with consumers through membership schemes, farm visits, farm shops and home deliveries. Many of these new initiatives echo descriptions by other authors (Zhang et el. this volume; Si et al. 2014; Scott et al. 2014; Qiao 2014 ) of emerging alternative food networks Zhang et al., this volume , in particular 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 23 Community Supported Agriculture or Participatory Guarantee Systems (Kirchner 2015) schemes.
Within such schemes certification plays a less important role. Interviewees reported how they wanted to sell to consumers who have built trust in their brand without certificate [interviewee 39, translated] and to have proper relationships with customers and build a community (informal conversation 75). Similar findings are described by Scott et al. (2014) .
Some actors within the global organic movement argue that the world needs to escape the limited perception that organic equates with certification (Gould 2015: 138) . David Gould Indeed, Scott et al. (2014) propose that consumers and small producers increasingly reject the state s assurances and begin the complex civil process of reconnecting and re-24 negotiating trust through direct relationships between producers and eaters Scott et al. 2014:164 (Barkema et al. 2015; Tang 2009 ). This may change as China moves from a focus on subsistence and safety towards other Chinese dreams . Yet, so far, the exact content of those dreams and the extent to which they resonate with principles of sustainable development remains to be seen. Vitterso et al. (2015) conclude in their recent study on organic consumption in Norway that it is important to open up the debate on what constitutes sustainable food consumption and production. We would add to this that it is crucial to take into account different contextualities within this debate.
Conclusion
Considering the rising economic, social and environmental importance of Chinese consumption and production systems, a better understanding of institutional changes within these systems is needed. Our paper focused on a transition towards organic consumption and   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   25 production. By shifting attention to the notion of legitimacy, we identified barriers for such a transition and explored the role of different actors and currently considered strategic adjustments in overcoming those barriers.
We find that in the highly fragmented Chinese agricultural system, perceptions of negative consequences associated with the support of the organic scheme are dominant. This holds for retailers and manufacturers but especially primary producers, who must make considerable adaptations to their practices to align with organic standards. Positive relational impacts are promised from the consumption stage but there is currently insufficient evidence of a translation of health and food safety concerns into consumer demand for organic produce. This partly relates to procedural legitimacy challenges associated with a dominant discourse around corrupt certification. These problems have given rise to calls for a tightening of organic labelling
procedures. Yet the unintended effect of such strategies is additional requirements for producers, which negatively affect consequential evaluations for small scale producers and, some argue, for society as a whole. As such, an inherent conflict between procedural and consequential aspects emerges, which mirrors findings in other sustainability product labelling contexts.
Reconfiguration of the Chinese organic labelling scheme towards more bottom-up participatory arrangements offers an alternative way forward. At least for the moment however, Alternative Food Networks are very much inspired by Western values of participation, which seem to find limited support in traditional Chinese culture.
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